°°°°perfection can be the enemy of the good.Policymakers need to make sure that the benefits of any additional reforms exceed their short-and long-run costs,in particular those related to investment incentives.And if there are to be reforms of the reforms it is desirable to package them together so that there can be one reform of the reforms rather than a continuing stream of them.Finally,if policymakers are serious about competitive markets for power they will have to rethink the long tradition of relying on taxation by regulation of the electric power industry to implement policies in ways that hide the associated costs from taxpayers.°°°°14.A strong political commitment to reform is important.Implementing a good electricity sector liberalization program is a technical,institutional and political challenge.Almost everywhere,some unanticipated(at least by the policymakers)problems emerged that required major or minor refinements to the original reform program.In some cases(e.g.UK,New Zealand,Alberta,Australia,Texas)the reforms were consistent with the continuing development of competitive markets and in other cases they were not(e.g.California,Ontario,Brazil).It appears that reforms that have strong pro-competition political support are more likely to respond to problems by identifying market or institutional imperfections and trying to fix them in ways that are consistent with the continued successful evolution of competitive wholesale and retail markets.They are also likely to be willing to live with some imperfections,recognizing that no market is perfect and that the cures can be worse than the disease.Where the commitment to competitive electricity markets is weak,when problems emerge policymakers are more likely to seek what appear to be quick fixes that undermine continued evolution of competitive markets or just cut and run from the competitive market agenda.If the commitment to competition is not strong in the first place,of course,the reforms are likely to be timid and have little effect on the status quo anyway,Japan and many US states being the prime examples.°°°°If policymakers do not have a strong commitment to competition and are unable to follow the basic textbook reform model outlined at the beginning of this chapter,sector performance may be better if they focus their attention on improving the traditional regulated monopoly model rather than dabbling with timid and flawed approaches to competition.°°°°Conclusion°°°°Structural,regulatory and market reforms have been applied to electricity sectors in many countries around the world.Significant performance improvements have been observed in some of these countries as a result of these reforms,especially in countries where the performance of state-owned monopolies was especially poor.Privatization and PBR mechanism applied to regulated distribution companies has generally yielded significant cost reductions without reducing service quality.Wholesale markets have also stimulated improved performance from existing generators and helped to mobilize significant investments in new generating capacity in several countries.°°°°However,efforts to create well-functioning competitive wholesale and retail markets have revealed many significant challenges and the restructuring and competition reforms remain a work in progress in most countries.The California electricity crisis,electricity crises in Brazil,Chile,Ontario,and elsewhere,scandals involving energy trading companies like Enron,the failure of poorly designed reforms in countries such as Brazil,macroeconomic problems undermining investments in generally well-designed systems as in Argentina,and ongoing political interference undermining private sector investments as in India and Pakistan,have certainly made policymakers more cautious(but not necessarily more thoughtful)about electricity sector reforms.The challenges associated with successful reforms have sometimes been underestimated.However,these problems and challenges do not imply that restructuring,regulatory reform,and promoting the development of competitive wholesale and retail markets for power,are ill-advised.The problems that have emerged are now much better understood and solutions to many of them are at hand.The primary question is whether governments properly can choose between competing solutions and have the political will to resist interest group pressures and pursue reforms that will lead to more efficient markets and better performance of the network platforms upon which competition depends.°°°°References°°°°Bacon,R.W.and Besant-Jones,J.E.(2001).Global electric power reform,privatization and liberalization of the electric power industry in developing countries.Annual Reviews of Energy and the Environment,26,331-359.°°°°Beesley,M.and Littlechild,S.(1989).The regulation of privatized monopolies in the United Kingdom.Rand Journal of Economics,20(3),454-472.°°°°Bertram,G.and Twaddle,D.(2005).Price--cost margins and profit rates 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Capitalism.Free Press,New York.°°°°Wolfram,C.(1999).Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market.American Economic Review,89(4),805-826.°°°°World Bank(1994).Infrastructure for Development:World Development Report 1994.°°°°PART I°°°°What’s Wrong with the Status Quo?°°°°Chapter 1°°°°Why Restructure Electricity Markets?°°°°FEREIDOON P.SIOSHANS1 AND WOLFGANG PFAFFENBERGER2°°°°1Menlo Energy Economics,Walnut Creek,CA,USA;2International University Bremen,°°°°Bremen,Germany°°°°Summary°°°°For nearly two decades,governments in a ber of countries have restructured and or liberalized their electricity supply industry.The motivations to change the regulatory regime and the expectations for the outcomes vary despite many commonalities.The experience of different countries,however,has been decidedly mixed,highly to mildly successful in some places,disappointing or disastrous in others.Understanding why some restructured markets are functioning successfully while others have not is the central theme of this book,which offers a variety of perspectives from different parts of the world.This chapter provides a review of the shortcomings of the traditional regulated monopoly structure,examines the motivations for restructuring and the expectations of policy-makers in introducing market reforms.°°°°1.1.Why Change the Status Quo?°°°°As the following chapters of this book point out,before the restructuring developments of 1980s and 1990s,the electricity supply industry(ESI)was generally organized and operated under one or a combination of the following two structures:°°°°?as state-owned enterprises(SOEs),or°°°°?as privately owned,regulated monopolies.°°°°In the former case,typically there was no independent regulator but a separate part of the government(e.g.the treasury)might exercise regulatory oversight or provide financial or fiduciary function.°°°°This model has some shortcomings.The taxpayers,for example,usually bear most investment risks and there may be poor accountability since the government agency is not directly accountable to consumers or shareholders.Moreover,under this scenario there tends to be some circularity,since different arms of government would be engaged in forecasting,planning,building,investing and operating as well as managing the network,setting and collecting retail tariffs.SOEs may not be overly sensitive to customer needs and may lack sufficient incentives to improve customer service or engage in technology innovation.In the case of many rapidly growing economies,central government may not have sufficient resources to adequately invest in infrastructure,resulting in chronic power shortages and poor service reliability.°°°°In the case of privately owned,regulated monopolies,which are prevalent in more advanced economies,the private sector owns and operates some or significant components of the ESI under the supervision of an independent regulator.Regulated monopolies could potentially offer some advantages relative to the centrally planned SOEs especially when there is a competent,resourceful,independent and vigilant regulator.At least in theory,this model could capture the significant economies of scale of large vertically integrated monopolies while controlling their abusive tendencies.Regulated monopoly regime could provide a degree of price stability and encourages long-term planning.In some countries,this model has resulted in the formation of a ber of large vertically integrated companies,which-according to some studies-offer significant cost savings.1 America,Germany and Japan,which are covered in the following chapters,offer examples of this regulatory paradigm,with a small ber of large vertically integrated utilities dominating the business.°°°°Despite these purported advantages,the regulated monopoly model has a ber of shortcomings,including the following:°°°°?Over-investment in rate base:Under traditional rate of return regulations in the USA,firms are rewarded for how much they have invested in infrastructure.Since the rate of return is typically fixed,regulated monopolies,all else being equal,prefer to have more assets in the so-called"rate base."This leads to a perverse tendency to over-invest,if permitted by the regulator,who typically has to approve capital investments in advance.2°°°°?Security of supply:In the regulated monopoly model,the trade-off between quality and price was usually biased toward security of supply as customers had no choice.As will be described in several chapters of this volume,in the transformation process to a market oriented model,this may cause some problems as customers,who are used to taking security of supply for granted,may not be conscious about the cost of quality or reliability.3°°°°?Risks borne by ratepayers:Regulated monopolies typically pass all investment risk to captive customers,who must bear it during the long life of capital assets.°°°°?No customer choice:In exchange for"the obligation to serve",regulated utilities get an exclusive service area,which means that customers have no choice in selecting a service provider even if a lower-cost option is available.4 While this may not be much of an issue for most small consumers,it may be a source of frustration for large,sophisticated consumers.°°°°?Price disparities:In many countries where neighboring areas are served by different utilities and or under different regulatory regimes,significant price disparities have evolved over time,causing significant pressure for change.Yet rigid regulations typically do not allow customers to switch suppliers.°°°°?Price subsidies:In many countries,the regulators,usually with tacit approval of politicians,find it convenient to allow,or encourage,cross-subsidization of rates between different customer classes.The same applies to various cost components of bundled service,making it difficult,for example,to decipher the cost of energy versus transmission services,versus distribution.As will be pointed out,competition encourages and or requires costs to be unbundled and be divulged,making it difficult to cross-subsidize certain customer classes or provide cross-subsidies between various service components.°°°°On the other hand,the regulated model has a ber of other attributes with potentially significant consequences for efficiency and price transparency:°°°°?Supply adequacy:Both SOEs and regulated monopolies are subject to a highly skewed reward and penalty system,which predisposes them to over-build.The reason is obvious.There will be a public inquiry and an outcry if there is a shortage of capacity,while hardly anyone notices if there is a little extra capacity sitting idle.One is tempted to conclude that because of this phenomenon,regulators rarely had to intervene in the past to ensure adequate reserve capacity-the ESI would always err on the side of having a little too much.By contrast,the issue of who is responsible for resource adequacy has become a hot topic in a ber of countries since the introduction of competition.5°°°°?Manipulation by politicians:SOEs and regulated monopolies offer irresistible opportunities for regulators and politicians to micro-manage and or"meddle"in the business.6 amples include efforts to manipulate prices,offer subsidies to certain constituents,or engage in other political or social experiments-which would be hard to justify in a competitive environment with publicly listed companies.For example,in many Indian provinces,farmers pay next to nothing for electricity-as a matter of political expediency.In Britain b°°°°¶HŌ¬‘ōőńĶͶB’≤ō°°°°¶@∑÷ŌŪ…Õ°°°°•ü0。